Full text of ' UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA LIBRARY 0 0004 1693 987 n S CX LIBRIS ^ UNI VERSITATI S ALBERT/ENSIS Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter University of Alberta compliments of Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies 352 Athabasca Hall University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta Canada, T6G 2E8 Telephone (403) 492-2972 Eax (403) 492-4967 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2016 with funding from University of Alberta Libraries Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter Edited by Peter J. Potichnyj, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski, Gleb N. Zekulin Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press University of Alberta Edmonton 1992 Copyright © 1992 Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta, Canada Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Ukraine and Russia in their historical encounter Papers from the first Conference on Ukrainian-Russian Relations held on Oct.
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8-9, 1981 in Hamilton, Ont. ISBN 0-920862-84-5 1. Ukraine — Relations — Soviet Union — 2. Soviet Union — Relations — Ukraine — Congresses. Potichnyj, Peter J., 1930- II.
Conference on Ukrainian-Russian Relations (1st: 1981: Hamilton, Ont.) DK 508.57.S65U4 1992 3 C92-091407-1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the copyright owner. PRINTED IN CANADA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA Table of Contents Introduction The Problem of a Ukrainian-Russian Dialogue / Omeljan Pritsak ix History A. Medieval and Early Modern History The Contest for the “Kievan Inheritance” / Jaroslaw Pelenski 3 Muscovite Perceptions of Other East Slavs before 1654 — An Agenda for Historians / Edward L. Keenan 20 The Unloved Alliance: Political Relations between Muscovy and Ukraine in the Seventeenth Century / Hans- Joachim Torke 39 B. Modern History Ukraine and Imperial Russia: Intellectual and Political Encounters from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century / Marc Raeff 69 Paul I and Ukraine / Edgar Hosch 86 Ukrainian and Russian Women: Co-operation and Conflict / Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak 101 Politics Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness /John A.
Armstrong 125 Ukrainian and Russian Perceptions of the Ukrainian Revolution /John S. Reshetar, Jr.
140 Political Relations Between Russians and Ukrainians in the USSR: the 1970s and Beyond / Yaroslav Bilinsky 165 VI Culture and Religion The Mask of Culture: Baroque Art in Russia and Ukraine, 1 600-1750 / James Cracraft 20 1 Ukrainian-Russian Literary Relations in the Nineteenth Century: A Formulation of the Problem / George G. Grabowicz 214 The Issues of Ukrainianization and Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukrainian-Russian Relations, 1917-1921 / Bohdan R. Bociurkixv 245 Economy and Demography Demographic Change among Russians and Ukrainians in the Soviet Union: Social, Economic and Political Implications / Ralph S. Clem 277 Socio-economic Changes in the USSR and Their Impact on Ukrainians and Russians / Peter Woroby 296 Conclusion /Nicholas V.
The Zinoviev letter was a document published by the British newspaper four days before the. It purported to be a directive from, the head of the (Comintern) in Moscow, to the, ordering it to engage in seditious activities. It said the resumption of diplomatic relations (by a government) would hasten the radicalisation of the British working class. This would have constituted a significant interference in British politics, and as a result it was deeply offensive to British voters, turning them against the Labour Party. The letter seemed authentic at the time, but most historians now agree it was a forgery.
The letter aided the, by hastening the collapse of the vote that produced a Conservative landslide. Argued that the most important impact was on the psychology of Labourites, who for years afterward blamed their defeat on foul play, thereby misunderstanding the political forces at work and postponing necessary reforms in the Labour Party. A cartoon from, published after the letter was released, depicting a stereotypical Bolshevik wearing a sandwich board with the slogan 'Vote for MacDonald and me' Background In 1924, the socialist formed a government for the first time. However, it was a and was liable to fall if the and combined against it. In foreign policy, the government recognised the in February 1924, and proposed to lend it money.
On 8 October 1924, the Labour government of suffered defeat in the on a; this forced MacDonald to go to to seek a dissolution of and a new election. The immediate cause of the parliamentary defeat had been the government's decision to drop the prosecution of communist editor under the, for publication of an open letter in calling on soldiers to 'let it be known that, neither in the class war nor in a military war, will you turn your guns on your fellow workers.' Was scheduled for 29 October. Letter Near the end of the short election campaign, there appeared in the press the text of a letter purporting to have originated from, head of the Executive Committee of the (Comintern) and Secretary of the Comintern and, a British representative at a conference of the Executive Committee, and addressed to the Central Committee of the (CPGB). One particularly damaging section of this letter read: A settlement of relations between the two countries will assist in the revolutionising of the international and British proletariat not less than a successful rising in any of the working districts of England, as the establishment of close contact between the British and Russian proletariat, the exchange of delegations and workers, etc. Will make it possible for us to extend and develop the propaganda of ideas of Leninism in England and the Colonies.
Publication The damning document was published in the conservative British newspaper four days before the election. The letter came at a sensitive time in relations between Britain and the Soviet Union, owing to Conservative opposition to the parliamentary ratification of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement of 8 August. The publication of the letter was severely embarrassing to Prime Minister MacDonald and his Labour Party.
Although his party faced the likelihood of losing office, MacDonald had not given up hope in the campaign. Following the letter's publication, any chance of an upset victory was dashed, as the spectre of internal revolution and a government oblivious to the peril dominated the public consciousness. MacDonald's attempts to cast doubt as to the authenticity of the letter were in vain, hampered by the document's widespread acceptance among government officials. He told his Cabinet that he 'felt like a man sewn in a sack and thrown into the sea. Election result The Conservatives decisively won the October 1924 election, ending the country's first Labour government. After the Conservatives formed a government with as Prime Minister, a Cabinet committee investigated the letter and concluded that it was genuine. The Conservative government did not undertake any further investigation, despite continuing allegations that the letter was forged.
On 21 November 1924, the government cancelled the unratified trade agreement with the Soviet Union. However, decided at the same time that the letter was a forgery. In order to protect its reputation, it did not inform the government, which continued to believe it was genuine. Denial by Zinoviev The Comintern and the Soviet government vehemently and consistently denied the authenticity of the document. Grigory Zinoviev issued a denial on 27 October 1924 (two days before the election), which was finally published in the December 1924 issue of, the monthly theoretical magazine of the CPGB, well after the MacDonald government had fallen.
Zinoviev declared: The letter of 15th September, 1924, which has been attributed to me, is from the first to the last word, a forgery. Let us take the heading. The organisation of which I am the president never describes itself officially as the 'Executive Committee of the Third Communist International'; the official name is 'Executive Committee of the Communist International.'
Equally incorrect is the signature, 'The Chairman of the Presidium.' The forger has shown himself to be very stupid in his choice of the date. On the 15th of September, 1924, I was taking a holiday in Kislovodsk, and, therefore, could not have signed any official letter. It is not difficult to understand why some of the leaders of the Liberal-Conservative bloc had recourse to such methods as the forging of documents. Apparently they seriously thought they would be able, at the last minute before the elections, to create confusion in the ranks of those electors who sincerely sympathise with the Treaty between England and the Soviet Union. It is much more difficult to understand why the English Foreign Office, which is still under the control of the Prime Minister, MacDonald, did not refrain from making use of such a white-guardist forgery. Dictates the Note to the British government in response to the Zinoviev letter.
Historians now agree that the letter had little impact on the Labour vote—which held up. It aided the Conservatives by inducing a collapse in the Liberal vote; this led to a Conservative landslide. Says the letter provided Labour 'with a magnificent excuse for failure and defeat.
The inadequacies that had been exposed in the Government in its brief existence could be ignored.' Indeed, many Labourites for years blamed their defeat on the letter, thereby, as Taylor notes, misunderstanding the political forces at work and postponing necessary reforms in the Labour Party. The result of the election was not disastrous to Labour.
The Conservatives were returned decisively, gaining 155 seats, making a total of 413 Members of Parliament. Labour lost 40 seats, retaining 151. The Liberals lost 118 seats, leaving them with only 40, and their vote count fell by over a million. The real significance of the election was that the Liberals—whom Labour had displaced as the second-largest political party in 1922—were now clearly a minor party. A 1967 British study deemed that the Labour Party was destined for defeat in October 1924 in any event, and argues that the primary effect of the purported Comintern communication was upon Anglo-Soviet relations: Under Baldwin, the British Government led the diplomatic retreat from Moscow.
Soviet Russia became more isolated, and, of necessity, more isolationist. The Zinoviev letter hardened attitudes, and hardened them at a time when the Soviet Union was becoming more amenable to diplomatic contact with the capitalist world. The proponents of world revolution were being superseded by more pliant subscribers to the philosophy of '. Thus, after successfully weathering all the early contradictions in Soviet Diplomacy, Britain gave up when the going was about to become much easier. And it gave up largely because the two middle-class parties suddenly perceived that their short-term electoral advantage was best served by a violent anti-Bolshevik campaign. Current scholarship.
Victor Madeira (2014)., Britain between the wars 1918–1940 (1955) 188–94. A.J.P.
Taylor English History 1914–1945 (1965) p. Taylor, English History: 1914–1945 (1965), pp. 218, 225. Keith Jeffery (2010). The National Archives, 16 February 2009 at the, retrieved Aug.
Gill Bennett, 'A Most Extraordinary and Mysterious Business': The Zinoviev Letter of 1924,' Historians LRD No. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Jan. Mowatt, Charles Loch (1955). Britain between the wars:1918–1940. Cambridge University Press.
Mowatt, Charles Loch (1955). Britain between the wars:1918–1940. Cambridge University Press.
Neilson, Keith (2006). Britain, Soviet Russia and the collapse of the Versailles order, 1919-1939. Cambridge University Press. Christopher Andrew (2009). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. ^ Bennett, 'A Most Extraordinary and Mysterious Business,' p.
Grigorii Zinoviev, 'Declaration of Zinoviev on the Alleged 'Red Plot', The Communist Review, vol. Taylor, English History: 1914–1945, pp. 219–20, 226–27. Charles Loch Mowat (1955). Taylor & Francis. Andrew J Williams (1989).
Manchester U.P. Lewis Chester, Steven Fay, and Hugo Young, The Zinoviev Letter: A Political Intrigue. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1968.
Chester, Fay, and Young, The Zinoviev Letter, pp. Chester, Fay, and Young, The Zinoviev Letter, p. Chester, Fay, and Young, The Zinoviev Letter, pp.
The book in question was Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev's The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives, published by HarperCollins in 1998. Bennett, A Most Extraordinary and Mysterious Business, pp. Bennett, Gill (18 October 2006). Churchill's Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence. Nigel West, At Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Chiefs of Britain's Intelligence Agency, MI6. London: Greenhill Books, 2006.
Churchill's Secret Enemy, by Jonathan Pile, 2011, lulu.com. ^.
The Guardian. Retrieved 26 December 2017.
Gill Bennett, The Zinoviev Letter: The Conspiracy that Never Dies. Oxford University Press, 2018.
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